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RISK COMMUNICATION UNDER SARA

proactive stance, the letter of the law requires very little
from LEPCs (Hadden, 1989; Musselman, 1989). Our
contention is that, regardless of Title Ill's provisions, a
sound case can be made for aggressive risk communication efforts, on the grounds of their value to the emergency planning mission. The following considerations
are pertinent:

survey of the chairs and members of a national sample of

STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE RISK COMMUNICATION
UNDER SARA TITLE III: PERSPECTIVES FROM
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

LEPCs conducted well after the 1988 deadline, together with

case studies of especially aggressive risk communication
efforts by LEPCs and other organizations (Conn et aI., 1990;
Rich et al" I990a); (3)case studies ofthe emergency and post-

emergency risk communication that accompanied actual
chemical accidents (Rich et aI., 1990b); and (4)a field test of

a technique for communicating fairly complicated emer-
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Abstract. Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 requires that planning and emergency response agencies
be able to communicate with the public in nonemergency situations in order to help citizens understand the risks they face from hazardous

materials and to secure citizen participation in designing responses to chemical emergencies. Both research and reports from the field indicate
that, with notable exceptions, most Local Emergency Planning Committees created for this purpose are making little or no effort at proactive
communication. As a result, citizens are not being educated effectively about the hazards they face and are not acting as full partners in
emergency response and risk management planning. This paper draws on research and field observations, identifies ten major barriers to sound
risk communication, and offers organizational and tactical suggestions for overcoming each barrier.
INTRODUCTION
The planning process mandated by Title III of the 1986
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)
requires that local planning and emergency response agencies be able to communicate with the public in nonemergency
situations, in order to help citizens understand the risks they
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Only if the public is made aware of risks is political
pressure for risk reduction likely to be generated. Most
responders and citizens would agree that it is far better to
avoid accidents than to attempt to cope with their consequences.

gency preparedness information in the absence of an emergency (conducted in cooperation with the National Institute
for Chemical Studies, and still in progress). We also have had
the opportunity to learn about the operation and practices of
many organizations with risk communication responsibilities through our role as editors of a quarterly publication
entitled Hazardous Materials Dialogue, which is distributed
to LEPCs, the State Emergency Response Commissions that
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face from hazardous materials and to secure citizen participation in designing responses to chemical emergencies. This
responsibility is vested most directly in SARA-mandated
Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) that have
been formed throughout the nation (see Musselman, 1989,
for an overview ofTitle III). Advocates ofthe legislation saw
this process as a potential catalyst for community debate
about environmental issues (Florio, 1987).
Unfortunately, both research and reports from the field indicate that, with notable exceptions, most LEPCs are having
little or no effort at communicating proactively with the
public. Even if they wish to increase their levels of communication, many lack the skills necessary to do so successfully.
As a result, citizens are not being educated effectively about
the hazards they face and are not acting as full partners in the
emergency response and risk management planning process
(Conn et aI., 1990).
This paper identifies some major barriers to effective
nonemergency risk communication and offers suggestions
about what can be done by LEPCs to overcome each barrier.
Our analysis is based on a combination ofour own and others'
research findings and on our less fonnal observations of
response and planning organizations.
Our research has involved four main components: (l)a mail
survey of the chairs and members of all LEPCs in Virginia
prior to Title Ill's October 1988 deadline for completing local
emergency response plans, as well as case studies examining
the activities of selected LEPCs (Conn et aI., 1988); (2)a mail
0191-5398/92 $3.00 + .00
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Although existing empirical evidence on the impact of
pre-emergency communication generally is inconclusive (Sorensen and Mileti, 1990), it is reasonable to
suppose that citizens who have been given infonnation
in advance are more likely to know how to cooperate
with responders in emergency situations and how to take
protective action, where possible. If so, communication
would make the responders' job easier and response
plans more effective.

oversee them, government officials, citizens' organizations,
and researchers across the nation.
Although we have confidence in the validity of the underlying research, we must recognize that our recommendations
for action have not been evaluated systematically in practice.
As a result, we suggest that, for the time being, they be judged
on highly pragmatic grounds-by asking if they make sense
in light of experience and ifthey work when tried. Certainly,
each recommendation will be more appropriate to some
LEPCs than to others.

Similarly, where full communication precedes an emergency, citizens may be more willing to accept officials'
instructions and cooperate with response efforts. If a
threat comes as a complete surprise, citizens may be
skeptical of authorities' interpretation of the danger and
judgement about how to respond to it. This could cause
delays that cost lives.

BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE RISK
COMMUNICATION
Our observations suggest ten broad problems that make it
difficult for LEPCs to mount risk communication programs.
Conceptually, these can be divided into problems that are
institutional (having to do with the design ofthe LEPCs) and
problems that are more situational (stemming from the nature
of chemical hazards and risk communication). In practice,
the two types of problems interact. In our opinion, many of
the difficulties LEPCs face in risk communication stem from
the fact that Title Ill's institutional arrangements were developed essentially without reference to the demands of the task
of risk communication. Our discussion will move from the
more institutional to the more situational problems. since it is
the fonner that set the context for addressing those problems
that are more practice-oriented.

I.

Unclear Mandate: Perhaps the most basic barrier to
effective risk communication is a lack of consensus
among LEPCs about what kind of risk communication
efforts are required of them under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (as SARA's
Title III also is called). The basic question is whether
they have to do anything more than (a)include members
from the SARA-mandated categories on their committees, (b)passively make information on chemical hazards available to the public, and (c)hold open planning
meetings. While the legislative history of Title III can
support an argument that the spirit of the law requires a

In the longer tenn, if citizens have a full understanding
of the dangers they face, they may become the political
allies of local responders, working to secure adequate
equipment, funding, and administrative support for response organizations.
2.

"Decide-and-Announce" Approach: Most LEPCs are
led by emergency responders and administrators who are
accustomed to evaluating the available infonnation,
deciding on the best course ofaction to protect the public,
announcing what will be done, and having their decision
accepted. While this may be essential in an emergency
situation, the approach does not build the trust necessary
for citizens to accept officialjudgments about acceptable
risks or appropriate emergency precautions, and it can
contribute to public "outrage" if things go wrong (Sandman, 1989). More important, this approach will not
overcome public resistance to risk messages and will fail
to get public attention in advance, so that citizens know
what to do in an emergency or can act as infonned
participants in the planning process (Scanlon, 1990).
Since responders cannot protect everyone in an emergency, it is vital that citizens do what they can to protect
themselves. It also makes more sense for the community
to debate chemical hazards openly and reach agreement
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on a policy to reduce the risk of accidents than to count

mental Protection Agency about the proper scope of

on being able to deal successfully with them when they
happen. As aresult, LEPCs and other responsible parties
should adopt a new approach to dealing with the public.

LEPC responsibility in this area could help them per-

committees. The central idea to convey here is that
citizens' acceptance of a risk message depends on their

which the LEPC does not try to reach citizens directly

acceptance of the process by which the content of a
message was detennined, just as much as it depends on
the perceived accuracy of the message (NRC, 1989).
Citizens are far more likely to accept a process as
legitimate if it was open to public scrutiny, input, and

but communicates with them through respected community organizations. By having community groups host

these individuals tend to set the agenda for most local

presentations prepared by the LEPC, distribute written
materials to their members, or sponsor discussions of
hazardous materials issues, LEPCs can reach a large
number of citizens far more cheaply than by doing these

questions. This means that success in getting a message
across (and in designing an effective response to hazards) can depend on providing for two-way communica-

the overall emergency response plan developed by the
LEPC. The risk communication plan should assign
authority for different aspects of nonemergency communication and should describe procedures to be followed
in efforts to reach the public. At a minimum, it should
specify in detail how chemical hazard infonnation will

be made available to the public (as required by Title 111)
and how the public will be assisted in making effective
use of this information. It also should provide for the
establishment of an advisory committee to assist in
fonnutating and disseminating messages, and for the
development of working relationships between response

planners and the local media.
6.

Political Fears: Public officials and business leaders

things directly. Moreover, this two-step approach allows LEPCs to enhance their credibility by "borrowing"

Since the tasks of risk communication go beyond field-

ing well-worded, eye-catching messages, LEPCs also

often are reluctant to have chemical hazards discussed

tion with the public.

the trust members have for their own organizations.
When people hear a message from a trusted source in a

openly, for fear that public debate will result in demands

Second, LEPCs should work to diversify their member-

familiar setting, they are far more likely to take it

may need to call on persons with experience in citizen
participation techniques who can help design and manage outreach efforts that involve two-way communica-

ship to bring in new perspectives. Most local committees
would benefit from having more members from civic
and community organizations, the medical profession

seriously than if it comes from an impersonal authority

tion. Such people usually can be found in city or county
planning departments. In addition, the local League of

incumbents for adverse situations. We refer to these
possible outcomes as "the risks of risk communication."

Women Voters often will have experience in encouraging citizen participation, and generally is regarded by
citizens as an objective, trustworthy sponsor of outreach

If LEPCs and others are to get the political support they

efforts.

find ways to overcome them.

through an anonymous channel (Krimsky and Plough,
1988). Moreover, LEPCs can magnify their resources by

(especially public health), businesses other than the
chemical industry, and the media. These people can

tapping into the volunteers, money, etc., that community
organizations can put into public education efforts. One
tactic for working through established groups is to create

bring a layman's perspective to discussions of what
citizens need to know to understand chemical hazards

a "speakers' bureau" of LEPC members and others who

and to become involved meaningfully in the planning
process. They also can help discover what approach to
risk communication might be most effective in reaching
the public in given locales. Having members from

for government action to reduce the hazards, will bring

pressure on local firms, or will lead the public to blame

need to engage in effective risk communication, they

must recognize these fears (whether justified or not) and

Local Emergency Planning Committees should approach

can make presentations on emergency preparedness at
meetings of local organizations.

Colleges and universities also can be valuable sources of
free or inexpensive advice about communication meth-

A second approach to overcoming resource limitations is

for the LEPC to seek funding and technical support for

seek faculty members in departments such as communication, planning, political science, sociology, and urban

risk communication efforts from the local chemical
industry, while maintaining control overwhatiscommu-

affairs, who may be willing to perform community

management. They should be prepared to argue that the

service by acting as consultants or by evaluating the

risks of not communicating are far greater than the risks

ods. Local Emergency Planning Committees should

different backgrounds also will help in solving some of
the other problems we address below.
3.

Several strategies can be employed to secure the skills
necessary for sound risk communication. It may be
possible to rely on the media representatives that SARA
mandates for each LEPC. In practice, however, these
individuals often are from the management side of the
media and can provide little help in solving practical
communication problems. In this situation, local committees would be well-advised to expand the number of
media members and, specifically, to recruit people who
can offer advice on how to design media campaigns. In
addition, they can tap into other pools of communication
skills, such as local advertising or public relations finns
who may be willing to provide expertise as a community
service.

Until they succeed in establishing this planning/advocating/coordinating role, LEPCs that accept responsibility
for proactive risk communication can stretch their resources through the following strategies. First, they
should recognize that risk communication often is most
effective when approached as a two-step process, in

efforts, and it must be systematic. For this reason, we
argue that risk communication efforts should be guided
bya plan,just as emergency preparedness is, and that the
plan for risk communication should be a fonnal part of

conditions, it is natural that local committees would give
little attention to such unfamiliar tasks.

suade other organizations to take operational roles in risk
communication.

A two-pronged attack is needed. First, there should be a
concerted effort to introduce LEPC members to new
ways of looking at their communication tasks. This
effort should focus especially on LEPC chairs, since
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officials with proposals for proactive risk communication efforts only after the committee members themselves have a finn understanding of the importance of
such efforts to effective emergency response and risk

Lack ofResources: Most LEPCs have neitherthe budget

nicated. Although individual plants may be reluctant to

impact of outreach efforts. Often, graduate students can

of informing the public. While revealing the existence of

nor the staff to undertake expensive and time-consuming
risk communication campaigns successfully. Part of the

make infonnation on hazards public, many facilities will

make valuable contributions by working as interns on

a hazard may bring government and business some

see working with the LEPC as a way of gaining public
trust (Covello et aI., 1988; Baram etal., 1992) and will be
willing to support the production and distribution of

LEPC projects or by taking on some aspect of the
LEPC's work as part of their research for advanced
degrees.

adverse publicity at first, this will be minor compared to
the outrage that would follow an accident in which lives

solution to this problem (and a big step toward resolving
others) is to define a proper role for the LEPC in risk
communication. Just as LEPCs are expected to plan
emergency responses but are not expected actually to
respond to emergencies, so they should plan a proactive
risk communication campaign without being expected
to actually carry out major risk communication tasks.
Their most productive roles are to design effective risk
communication systems, to act as advocates for aggressive risk communication efforts by other agencies, and to
coordinate the communication efforts of other organiza-

tions (Conn et aI., 1990; Rich et aI., 1990a).
Their success in adopting these roles will depend on their
ability to persuade other public agencies and private
organizations to take responsibility for major risk communication tasks. Clear directions from the Environ-

pamphlets, videos, and other materials. Care must be
taken, however, to avoid the reality, or even the percep-

tion, of industry cooption of the LEPC's message.
4.

5.

were lost or people were injured, because citizens had

Lack of Procedures: The vast majority of LEPCs have

not been informed of a danger known to public or private
officials. Most officials should be able to see advance

not developed procedures for communicating routinely
with the public about chemical hazards (Conn et aI.,

est. In addition, LEPCs can suggest that educational

communication as being in their enlightened self-interefforts are likely to make emergency response more

Lack of Expertise in Risk Communication: Risk com-

1990; Lindell and Meier, 1991). They talk with industry

munication is a complex business in which wellintentioned efforts can tum into a waste of resources, or
even a public relations disaster. Successfully fannulating and delivering risk messages requires knowledge

and government agencies, but any efforts to reach the
public usually are ad hoc responses to specific problems.
While emergency communication responsibilities gen-

effective, thereby enhancing officials' standing with the
public.

erally are well-established, responsibility for

Since many of local officials' fears about proactive risk
communication revolve around concerns about its potentially negative impact on the business community, a

and skills that most LEPC members simply don't have.

nonemergency communication seldom is delegated spe-

Similarly, actively involving citizens in the planning

cifically, with the result that it usually is given a low
priority.

process requires public relations skills and knowledge of
citizen participation techniques that are possessed by

few LEPC members (Conn et aI., 1990). Under these

To be successful, risk communication must be integrated
into overall response planning and risk management

good strategy is to enlist the aid of local industry representatives when trying to sell risk communication programs to local government. Similarly, some officials
fear overreaction by local environmental or neighbor-
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hood groups. Since showing that these groups approve
of the planned activities and will act responsibly may
reassure public officials, LEPCs should include such
groups in the design of risk communication pro~rams
and, if possible, get their endorsement before gOIng to
office holders for support.
Arguably, LEPCs should not undertake any major risk
communication effort without being sure that pubhc
officials are aware of its purpose and methods in advance. If the activity sparks controversy and officials
have not been informed about it, they may feel betrayed
and withdraw support for LEPC efforts.

7.

Public Resistance: There is a widespread perception
among LEPC members that most citizens just don't pay
attention to environmental hazards. Psychology and
communications studies provide plenty of reasons for
this behavior (see, for example, Douglas, 1985; Marks,
1990; Perrow, 1984). Among the more prominent explanations are the following:
Most environmental hazards pose a threat only in the
future, while people have their hands full dealing with
immediate problems;
Peoplehaveto be prepared to receive complex messages,
and most citizens do not have the knowledge or backround
to understand risk infonnation, and as a result, ignore it;
Modem communications techniques flood people with
messages that claim to be important, so that it is very
difficult for anyone message to get through.

Together, these and other factors produce what appears
as public apathy toward hazardous materials issues. But
a variety of psychological processes also work to create
actual resistance to risk messages. For example, the risks
ofa chemical accident often are beyond the control of the
average individual, but have the potential of being overwhelming. Accepting this reality means accepting one's
own vulnerability and can create fears that are emotionally painful. To avoid this discomfort, people may
engage in denial, ignoring the danger and refusing to take
steps to prepare for an emergency.
Suggestions for ways to overcome this resistance are
both procedural and substantive. Procedurally, it is vital
that authorities be able to point to an open, balanced
process by which hazards were analyzed and selected for
attention, the content of messages was developed, and
risk management plans were laid. Only then are skeptical citizens more likely to accept information and instructions as legitimate (Fessenden-Raden et aI., 1987).
For a process to be "open and balanced," citizens from a
variety of backgrounds should be selected to participate

by a disinterested party, and the citizen members of the
group must have more than advisory authority in determination of the final outcomes.
Substantively, there are a variety of measures that can
help overcome public resistance to risk messages (see,
for example, NRC, 1989). First, LEPCs must study their
intended audience and design messages specifically for
it. The goal is to discover relevant facts about the
audience (e.g., where they work, shop, and play; how
mobile they are) and to understand their concerns and
values (e.g., what health fears they have; what hazards
they worry about).

Second, LEPCs should not assume that one message will
reach all groups. It is vital to segment the audience and
design appeals tailored to the concerns and interests of
each segment. This will mean using not only different
"appeals," but also different methods of delivery-talks
to civic groups, videos, direct mailings, TV spots, etc.
Third, it is essential to pretest messages. The fact that a
message is technically accurate does not mean that it will
communicate the desired content or have the desired
emotional impact (Slovic, 1987). Before finalizing the
message, it is essential to present draft versions to small
samples of the intended audience in controlled environments and to discuss what they leamed and how they
were made to feel. This will reduce the chances of
unintended consequences.
Fourth, messages should be tied to immediate concerns
and behaviors. People are more likely to be motivated by
immediate problems than by distant ones and are more
likely to hear and respond to a message if there is
something they can do with the information. It also
helps, where possible, to provide citizens with a concrete
reminder of the message, like a phone plate, bumper
sticker, key chain, or fact card.
Fifth, suggestions for concrete defensive measures that
citizens can take always should accompany risk messages. Alerting people to a danger without offering them
a way to protect themselves only creates fear and can
encourage them to "tune out" the warning.

Sixth, risks should be explained using layman's terms
and familiar comparisons, when possible. Most people
are intimidated by chemical names and statistics and
often will ignore messages that are ladened heavily with
them.
Seventh, risk communication should be viewed as an
ongoing process. It will be necessary to repeat information campaigns on a regular basis, due to population
turnover, fading memories, and changes in individual
circumstances.
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with information. Similarly, environmental groups and
academics generally are regarded by the public as trustworthy (Bord et al., 1991) and should be utilized in risk
communication. Second, attentive citizens are more
likely to trust information if they have a chance to
question the source and explore assumptions behind
conclusions (Slovic, 1987). For that reason, whenever
possible, it is wise to present especially important or
sensitive infonnation in public forums where there can
be two-way communication between citizens and officials. Such forums should be a regular part of risk
communication efforts and should be designed to encourage questions and expressions of opinions from
citizens. Third, it generally will help to diversify the
range of persons involved in response planning so that
likely critics (environmental groups, for example) are
well-informed and do not promote misperceptions by
challenging the validity of official statements exclusively as a result of having incomplete information.
Formally including such groups in the presentations at
public forums can help persuade citizens that the process
is open.

Eighth, where possible, hazardous materials risk communication efforts should be integrated with natural
hazards education efforts to maximize impact and reduce duplication.

8.

Popular Misperceptions of Risks: Those responsible for
communicating about chemical hazards often express
frustration over what they perceive as the public's tendency to misunderstand risks. On the one hand (as
discussed above), people sometimes disregard risks when
experts feel that they should be far more concerned and
should take precautionary actions. On the other hand,
officials often fear that citizens will become excessively
concerned about relatively minor risks if "agitated" by
public discussion of the risks-as when they oppose
construction of a hazardous waste treatment facility that
experts think will pose little danger (Bord et aI., 1991).
The public does not always see risks in the same context
as public officials or scientific experts (Krimsky and
Plough, 1988). However, problems develop when officials are too cautious about giving citizens the infoffilation they may need to protect themselves or to participate
effectively in public policy debate. When this happens,
responders and planners often make their own tasks
more difficult by leaving the public in the dark (Johnson
et aI., 1988). Uninformed citizens may nottake the right
steps in an emergency and can not be counted on to
pressure government to support emergency preparedness fully. Moreover, poorly informed citizens will be
less able to contribute insights and suggestions to the
planning process. The challenge, then, is to inform
citizens of hazards in ways that provide adequate motivation for them to take necessary defensive measures
and become involved in the debate over risk reduction
and emergency preparedness, but that do not create an
overreaction.
First, it is important to recognize that there is no way to
guarantee that citizens will reach the conclusions that
officials want them to draw from risk information; therefore, it is a mistake to consider risk communication
efforts successful only if citizens accept the official view
as a result. In a democratic society, citizens are given
infonnation so that they can reach their own conclusions
about what is an acceptable risk or an appropriate risk
management measure.
There are, however, ways to increase the chances that
risk infoffilation will be taken seriously and an overreaction will be avoided. First, it is important to rely on
trusted sources to convey the message. Since research
suggests that citizens view medical professionals as
highly credible (McCallum et al., 1990), LEPCs are well
advised to establish contacts with the local medical
communities and to enlist their aid in reaching the public

When accidents do occur, it is important to monitor the
risk content of emergency messages and follow up to
correct any misperceptions that may have been created.
Citizens may overestimate or underestimate lingering
health risks after an incident and may, therefore, either
worry unnecessarily or fail to take needed precautions to
avoid adverse health effects. If there is reason to think
misperceptions are common, officials should attempt to
correct them with direct mailing or phone calls, if possible.

9.

Media Indifference to Issues: There is a widespread
perception among LEPC members that, in the absence of
a dramatic event such as an accident or reports of safety
violations, the media are not sufficiently concerned with
chemical risks. Whether this disinterest stems from the
media's lack of understanding of what is at stake in
situations involving hazardous materials or from differences in what the media and public officials consider to
be "a story," the effect is that there seldom is a strong
alliance between risk communicators and the local media.
While some progress can be made by appealing to the
civic responsibility of the media to promote public
safety, in most cases LEPCs must attempt to meet the
needs of the media if they are to get adequate coverage
of hazardous materials issues (see National Safety Council, no date.). It is important to recognize that the media
are businesses, as well as public servants, which means
that securing an audience may be as important to them as
telling the "truth." They may not even seek to uncover a
single truth; rather, as Sandman (1986) has suggested,
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they may set out to present competing claims as fairly as
possible, leaving the task of detennining truth to the
readers.
Two strategies are among those that can help to improve
media coverage of hazardous materials issues. The first
involves the development of better working relationships between the media and LEPCs. A highly recommended approach is for LEPCs to hold annual "mediaresponder workshops," in which key members of the
local media are brought together with emergency planners and responders so that each can learn about the
issues and job demands of the other. Media people can
be educated about the facts of chemical risks and response techniques so they can be better infonned, mativatedreporters of hazardous materials stories. Responders can learn how to make a story attractive to the media.
It also can help for each LEPC to develop a "press kit,"
which provides reporters with background information
that will enhance their ability to cover stories involving
hazardous materials under both emergency and
nonemergency conditions. The press kit should include
information on the Title 1Il planning process and any
local efforts to inform the public about chemical hazards
or emergency response procedures.
In order to further improve interaction with the media,
LEPCs should seek to develop ongoing working relationships with specific reporters who are assigned to
cover environmental issues or local government in their
area. These people should be kept well-informed of
LEPC activities and given material for stories, whenever
possible. Local committees also should see their media
representative members as resources and learn all they
can from them about the operation of the media.
Our observations suggest that media representatives
seldom are active members of the LEPC and may feel a
certain conflict of interest in being in the position of both
contributing to the making of news (as a Committee
member) and reporting it. For that reason, it usually is
unwise to recruit as members of the LEPC those reporters who are most likely to cover hazardous materials
issues. At a minimum, their membership may reduce
their credibility with the public.
The second strategy for increasing media attention involves the linking of chemical safety news to other
community issues, such as education, economic development, or transportation. This can be done through
such tactics as getting community organizations to sponsor hazardous materials education efforts and involving
the public in the planning process through public forums
that warrant news coverage. In addition, LEPCs should
not shy away from controversy, as this is both a good way
to bring out useful new information and perspectives and
a way to ensure media attention.

10. Insufficient Channels for Reaching the Public: Even if
LEPCs are clear about their risk communication objectives and know how to frame their messages, they still
may be stymied by their inability to deliver information
to the public. In part, this is simply a question of how to
cut through the torrent of information and images to
which Americans are exposed, in order to capture citizens' attention. In addition, however, the question of
channels is an issue ofcredibility. Having the public hear
your message is only effective if the public also regards
the message as trustworthy. Citizens often distrust information about chemical hazards and do not regard all
sources as equally knowledgeable or believable (Krimsky
and Plough, 1988). The task here is to find methods of
getting messages to people in ways that will maximize
the chances that they actually will listen to them and
accept them as true.
Rather than trying to carve new channels, LEPCs can
make use of existing lines of communication about
health and matters of community welfare more efficiently. One strategy is to undertake a study of the
sources that people already rely on for information on
health and community welfare issues in a given community. Once these channels are identified, the LEPC can
use them to attempt to get its messages out. In addition,
it usually will be helpful to enlist the aid of the local
medical community. Not only should medical personnel
be used as spokespersons, but also they should be educated about chemical hazards and encouraged to discuss
the issue with patients, whenever relevant.
CONCLUSION
Local Emergency Planning Committees have a unique opportunity to focus public attention on local environmental
issues and promote long-range thinking about these issues.
To take advantage of this opportunity, the local committees
will have to become far more proactive in their risk communication efforts. We believe that there are many possible
grounds on which to make the case for LEPCs to pay greater
attention to nonemergency risk communication; however, as
indicated in this paper, its potential contribution to fulfilling
the LEPCs' emergency planning mission may be sufficient.
Thus, the present ambiguity of Congressional expectations
with regard to the LEPCs' role in risk communication need
not be an issue. The most important task, we believe, is to
mount a major educational and administrative support effort,
first to persuade the LEPCs ofthe importance ofnonemergency
risk communication, and then to assist them in doing it
successfully.
Critical to this effort is the definition of a proper role for
LEPCs--{)ne that has them planning for proactive risk communication without being expected to undertake the communication by themselves. Given the LEPCs' current lack of
resources in most places, it would be unrealistic to expect
more of them. The LEPCs do need to know what efforts are
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required, and they need to persuade other public and private
organizations to undertake these efforts. It is evident that they
face many problems in doing so, but this paper has indicated
that knowledge and strategies are available to help them
overcome the barriers.
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